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TORT LIABILITY FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF THE
AIDS VIRUS: DAMAGES FOR FEAR OF AIDS AND
PROSPECTIVE AIDS
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an epidemic, fatal
disease.' The Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV)2 causes AIDS by
weakening the human immune system and leaving the system susceptible to
1. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 1, 12 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT]. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) kills 16% of -people with
AIDS within three months of diagnosis, 23% within six months of diagnosis, 35% within a
year, 57% within two years, and 81 c7b within three years. Fatteh, AIDS: An Exhaustive Review
of Medical and Legal Aspects, in LEGAL MEDICINE 1986 1, 3 (C. Wecht ed. 1986). Although
only half of the people who have contracted AIDS have died, AIDS eventually is fatal.
SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra, at 12; LEGAL-MEDICAL STUDIES, INC., AIDS: LEGAL
PoLICIES 3 (1985) [hereinafter LEGAL POLIcIEs].
Currently, no cure for AIDS exists. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra, at 10. The AIDS
virus mutates 100 to 1000 times faster than a normal virus. Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat,
TIM, Aug. 12, 1985, at 15. Scientists have been unable to study the AIDS virus long enough
to decode the virus and prepare a vaccine. Id. Accordingly, scientists do not expect to develop
a safe and effective vaccine against AIDS within the next 10 years. E. FINEBERG, AIDS IMPACT
ON PUBUC POLICY 18 (1986). AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate. SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra, at 6. Since the identification of 60 initial AIDS cases in 1981, the number of
reported AIDS cases has risen exponentially. Fatteh, supra, at 3; see W. DoRmNmTE, AIDS
AND Tim LAW 87 (1987) (stating that number of reported AIDS cases doubles every fourteen
to fifteen months). In August 1987 health officials had reported over 39,200 cases of AIDS
in the United States. Stengel, The Changing Face of AIDS, TIME, August 17, 1987, at 12. In
addition, approximately 1.5 million Americans carry the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
(HIV), which causes AIDS. SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra, at 13. Authorities estimate
that by 1991 some 145,000 people in the United States will have AIDS. Id. In addition,
approximately 179,000 Americans will die of AIDS by 1991. Id. The Surgeon General expects
54,000 Americans to die from AIDS in that year alone. Id. at 28.
2. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 9. Scientists also have named the
AIDS virus Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III (HTLV-III) and Lymphadenopathy As-
sociated Virus (LAV). Id.
Researchers have detected HIV in several body fluids. Id. at 16. Blood and semen are the
only proven effective transmitters of HIV. Id. A person infected with HIV [hereinafter an
HIV carrier] can transmit HIV without having AIDS. Id. at 11. An HIV carrier, like a person
who has AIDS, transmits HIV through sexual contact, the sharing of contaminated intraveneous
needles and syringes, and the transfusion of blood products. Id. A pregnant woman carrying
HIV also may transmit HIV to her child during pregnancy or birth. Id. at 20. Researchers
have concluded, however, that a person cannot transmit HIV through common exposure, such
as sharing meals, sneezing, coughing or other casual contact. Id. at 21.
Instead of causing AIDS, HIV may cause the AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 11. ARC is similar to AIDS but generally less severe
than AIDS. Id. Symptoms of ARC include weight loss, fever, night sweats, diarrhea and lack
of resistance to infection. Id. A person with ARC may later develop AIDS. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE & NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, MOBLIZING AGAINST AIDS 22 (1986) [hereinafter
MOBILIZING AGAnlsr AIDS]. ARC can be fatal. Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1988, at A14, col.
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infections a healthy system could resist. 3 A person infected with HIV ("HIV
carrier") may carry the virus for many years before developing AIDS. 4 In
3. Fatteh, supra note I, at 7; SUROEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10. HIV
attacks white blood cells, the primary agent of the human immune system. Id. AIDS develops
when the HIV's assault has caused an almost complete failure of the immune system. Id. at
1-2. Common symptoms of AIDS include fatigue, fever, weight loss, diarrhea, and the
enlargement of lymph glands in the neck and groin. Fatteh, supra, note 1 at 9-10. A person
who develops AIDS is unusually susceptible to several viral, protozoal, fungal and bacterial
infections. Id. at 8 (1986). The two most common illnesses of a person with AIDS are
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) and Kaposi's Sarcoma. Address by Dr. Mervyn
Silverman, Symposium of the Arizona State University Center for the Study of Law, Science
and Technology (April 7-8, 1986), in RESPONDING TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIc 3, 5 (1986) thereinafter
Silverman]. PCP is a severe pneumonia with symptoms that include fever, respiratory problems,
weight loss and general malaise. SURGEON GENERAtL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-12; Fatteh,
supra note 1, at 9. Kaposi's sarcoma is a skin cancer that causes purplish blotches and bumps
on the skin. Id. at 12. Normally, Kaposi's sarcoma is a relatively mild disease that rarely
causes death. Silverman, supra, at 5. However, Kaposi's sarcoma can kill an AIDS victim.
Id.
In addition, HIV may attack the nervous system, causing brain damage. SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. HIV's effect on a person's brain may cause head
aches, loss of motor and speech control, impaired mental funcioning, loss of vision, and
seizures. Fatteh, supra note 1, at 9.
4. Allen, Etiology, Epidemiology and Natural History of AIDS and HTL V-Ill/LA V
Infection, in AIDS: TiE LEGAL Cows ExrrEs oF A NATIONAL CIsIs 123, 140 (E. Alter ed.
1987). HIV can remain latent for an incubation period of months and even years. Fatteh,
supra note 1, at 3. Experts disagree over exact incubation periods for AIDS, but all concur
that incubation periods may vary widely from individual to individual. Allen, supra at 140.
Most experts predict incubation periods ranging from less than a year to more than seven
years. Id. One researcher has stated that an infected person can harbor HIV for 14.2 years
before developing AIDS. See Fatteh, supra note 1, at 4-5 (discussing estimates of AIDS
incubation period). Authorities consider five years a reasonable mean incubation period for
AIDS. Id.; Allen, supra, at 140. Even if the HIV carrier never develops AIDS, the HIV carrier
still has the potential to develop the disease for a long time. Id. at 139. Because HIV genetically
imprints itself into a host cell, HIV may infect an HIV carrier for the rest of the carrier's
life. Id. As long as a person carriers HIV, he is at substantial risk of developing AIDS.
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
Because of HIV's unpredictable incubation period and scientists' limited experience with
HIV, scientists have difficulty estimating an HIV carrier's risk of developing AIDS. Allen,
supra, at 140. Most authorities estimate that 20% to 40% of HIV carriers will develop AIDS
within five years. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (estimating that
20% to 30% of HIV carriers will develop AIDS within five years); Silverman, supra note 3,
at 8 (estimating that 40% of HIV carriers will develop AIDS); MOBizrG AGAINST AIDS,
supra note 2, at 21 (discussing studies which show that 25% to 34% of homosexual male HIV
carriers develop AIDS within four years). Scientists are uncertain, however, whether in long-
term projections an HIV carrier's risk of developing AIDS will increase or decrease. MOBnZINmG
AGAINST AIDS, supra, at 22. If the risk proves not to decrease over time, the incidence of
AIDS among HIV carriers will be much higher than current estimates indicate. Id. No evidence
indicates that the risk of AIDS decreases over time. Id. On the contrary, evidence indicates
that the risk of AIDS increases over time. See Barnes, AIDS: Statistics But Few Answers,
SCIENCE, June 12, 1987 1423, 1424 (stating that long term study of HIV carriers indicates that
15% of HIV carriers will develop AIDS within five years and 36% of HIV carriers will develop
AIDS within six and one-half years). In addition, another 25% of HIV carriers will develop
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC) within five years. MOBIZNG AGAINST AIDS, supra, at 22; see
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response to the widespread suffering and death that AIDS has caused,
commentators have argued that courts should allow an AIDS victim to
maintain a cause of action against the person who infected the AIDS victim
with HIV.5 In addition, conventional tort theory should allow an HIV
supra note 2 (discussing ARC). Early studies of ARC indicate that 6% to 20% of ARC
patients will develop AIDS. Id.
A growing body of evidence suggests that HIV will cause sickness in most HIV carriers.
Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 6. Under the present definition of AIDS, only HIV
carriers with opportunistic diseases such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's
Sarcoma have full-blown AIDS. Id. at A14, col. 1; see supra note 3 and acompanying text
(discussing opportunistic diseases associated with AIDS). Alternative definitions of AIDS would
include HIV carriers who develop ARC, dementia, and other serious symptoms of HIV
infection. Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1988, at A14, col. 1. Many HIV carriers who do not have
AIDS under the present definition of AIDS are still very sick and may even die from HIV
infection. Id. Furthermore, scientists at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research estimate that
90% of HIV carriers will suffer measureable damage to their immune systems within three to
five years of infection. Id. Federal health officials also estimate that HIV carriers develop
ARC ten times more often than HIV carriers develop AIDS. Id. Because physicians often
confuse ARC with other illnesses, such as hepatitis and mononucleosis, ARC probably occurs
more often than figures indicate. Id.; see supra note 2 (discussing ARC).
5. See, e.g., Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131, 135 (1986) (stating that blood bank
negligent in providing for purity of blood products may be liable for transmission of AIDS);
Hermann, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 Uirv. CoLo. L. R~v. 63, 106-07
(1987) (stating that in certain circumstances, courts should hold people and institutions liable
for transmitting AIDS to AIDS victim); Note You Never Told Me . . You Never Asked:
Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REv. 529, 529-30 (1986)
(stating that by analogy to herpes and venereal disease cases, person should be liable for
sexually transmitting AIDS to AIDS victim).
A person who knowingly transmits AIDS to a sexual partner may be liable under theories
of battery, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, or tort based on a statutory violation.
See Hermann, supra, at 89 (discussing four possible causes of action against person who
infects AIDS sufferer with AIDS); You Never Told Me, supra, at 529 (recognizing battery,
fraud, and negligence as possible causes of action against person who transmits AIDS sexually).
Similarly, a person who knowingly transmits AIDS by sharing a contaminated intraveneous
needle may also be liable under theories of battery, fraudulent misrepresentation, or negligence.
See Hermann, supra, at 83-84 (recognizing possible causes of action against person who allowed
AIDS victim to inject needle contaminated with HMV).
In theory hospitals, blood banks and other institutions that transfuse blood, may be liable
for the transmission of HIV under strict products liability or an implied warranty of fitness.
See Lipton, supra, at 132 (recognizing strict liability or implied warranty as possible means
for AIDS sufferer to recover damages for contracting AIDS from contaminated blood prod-
ucts); Hermann, supra, at 77 (same). However, statutes in most jurisdictions now protect
blood banks and hospitals from strict products liability or implied warranty liability for the
transfusion of contaminated blood products. See Lipton, supra, at 135 (stating that 47
jurisdictions define blood transfusion as service not subject to implied warranties or strict
liability). Hospitals and blood banks, however, may be liable for the negligent transfusion of
AIDS-contaminated blood. See id. at 135 (recognizing possible liability for negligent blood
donor services); Hermann, supra, at 106 (recognizing common law negligence as most likely
means of recovery for AIDS victim who contracts AIDS from contaminated blood products).
Despite highly effective testing and screening procedures, medical authorities estimate that an
average of 75 people per year will contract AIDS through infected blood transfusions.
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carrier who has not developed AIDS to recover damages for the fear of
developing AIDS.6 By extension, conventional tort theory also may allow
an HIV carrier to recover damages for developing AIDS before the carrier
develops AIDS.7
Because of similarities between HIV and carcinogens, courts analyzing
liability for transmitting HIV should examine a defendant's liability under
established law for exposing a plaintiff to a carcinogen. 8 Carcinogens and
HIV both cause painful, deadly and incurable diseases. 9 In addition, the
effects of both carcinogens and HIV are not evident for long and variable
periods. 0 Similar to AIDS, cancer is a latent disease that normally develops
years after a person's exposure to a carcinogen." Courts allow a plaintiff
suing for exposure to a carcinogen to recover damages for the plaintiff's
fear of developing cancer if the plaintiff meets certain requirements. 2 First,
Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1987, at A9, col. 2.
.Commentators also have pointed out the possible liability of institutions such as hospitals,
schools, and prisons to persons contracting AIDS from fellow patients, students, or prisoners.
See Comments of Charles Brewer and William Jones, Arizona State University Center for
Study of Law, Science and Technology Symposium (April 7-8 1986) in RESPONlDING TO THE
AIDS EPIMhuc 103 (1986) (discussing possible civil liability for transmitting AIDS). For
instance, prison officials may have a duty to segregate inmates with HIV to prevent the spread
of AIDS through homosexual rape. Id. at 110. Also, a doctor who diagnoses an HIV infection
in a patient may have a duty to inform the patient's sexual partner of the danger of AIDS.
Id. at 115; see Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal.Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding psychologist liable for failure to disclose patient's intent to commit
murder); see generally Note, The Conflict Between a Doctor's Duty to Warn a Patient's Sexual
Partner that the Patient Has Aids and a Doctor's Duty to Maintain Patient Confidentiality,
45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 355 (1988).
6. See infra notes 12-87 and accompanying text (discussing HIV carrier's ability to
recover damages for fear of AIDS).
7. See infra notes 88-152 and accompanying text (discussing HIV carrier's ability to
recover damages for prospective case of AIDS that has not yet developed).
8. See infra, notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between carcin-
ogens and HIV).
9. See H. BoYLE, MALIGNANT NEGLECT 4-5 (1979) (stating that cancer is now second
leading cause of death among Americans); STEDMA's MEDICAL. DICTIONARY 223 (5th ed. 1982)
(defining carcinogen as any substance that produces cancer); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying
text (stating that HIV causes AIDS, which is fatal).
10. See H. BoYLE, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that cancers have long latency period);
supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that HIV infection may have long latency period
before developing into AIDS). Not every exposure to a carcinogen results in cancer. Id. at 43.
In addition, because the carcinogen must pass through a series of events before interacting
with cells and causing cancer, the latency period of most cancers is from five to forty years.
Id.
11. See H. BoYLE, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that latency periods for cancer commonly
run from five to forty years); supra note 4 (discussing latency period for AIDS).
12. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir. 1986) (allowing
recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on plaintiff's inhalation of asbestos fibers);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing recovery
for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on plaintiff's inhalation of asbestos fibers), cert. denied
106 S.Ct. 1339 (1986); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1228 (D. Mass.
1986) (allowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on plaintiff's exposure to toxic
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courts require the plaintiff to meet a standard of reasonable and genuine
fear of cancer.' 3 Second, courts require the plaintiff to suffer physical injury
from exposure to the carcinogen.'
4
chemicals through contaminated ground water); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.
Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (allowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on
plaintiff's exposure to diethylstilbestrol); Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 80, 179 A.2d
401, 413 (1962) (allowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on plaintiff's severe
chemical burns); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996,
999 (1958) (allowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer based on plaintiff's X-ray bums);
see also Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CUMB.
L. REv. 723, 730 (1985) (stating that courts considering fear of cancer universally have accepted
theory of recovery, and minority of courts denying recovery have done so because of factual
defects in plaintiff's case).
In addition to allowing recovery for fear of cancer, courts have allowed plaintiffs to
recover damages for fear of future illnesses or conditions other than cancer. See, e.g., Martin
v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing recovery of damages
for plaintiff's fear of paralysis and circulatory system problems from bullet wound), cert.
denied 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(allowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of sickness after exposure to active tuberculosis); Hayes
v. New York Cent. R.R., 311 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1962) (allowing recovery for plaintiffs
fear of amputation after frostbite); Kapuschinsky v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.S.C.
1966) (allowing recovery for plaintiff's anxiety over possible development of arthritis after
doctor's malpractice); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Ky. 1984) (allowing recovery
for plaintiff's fear of future neurological, eye and speech problems resulting from skull injury);
Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, -, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (1964) (allowing recovery for
plaintiff's fear of bone deterioration after automobile accident).
13. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that plaintiff is entitled to damages for mental anguish where fear of cancer is
reasonable and causally related to defendant's negligence); Wetherill v. University of Chicago,
565 F.Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (stating that notion of proximate cause requires
plaintiff to show reasonable fear of cancer to recover damages for fear of cancer); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251-252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 176, 996, 998 (1958)
(holding that plaintiff must show genuine and reasonable fear to recover for fear of cancer);
Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis.2d 515, 519, 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (holding that
plaintiff could not recover for fear of cancer because fear was unreasonable and remote from
injury).
14. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3rd Cir. 1986) (allowing
claim for plaintiff's fear of cancer because plaintiff suffered present physical injury); Adams
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying plaintiff's claim
for fear of cancer because jury concluded plaintiff had no physical injury); Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that plaintiff must
show physical injury to recover damages for fear of cancer); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1982) (denying recovery for plaintiff's fear of cancer
because plaintiff did not have present physical injury); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189
N.J.Super. 561, 571, 461 A.2d 184, 189 (1983) (denying recovery for plaintiffs' fear of cancer
because plaintiffs had no present physical injury), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 106 N.J. 557,
525 A.2d 287 (1987).
The majority of courts hold that a plaintiff cannot recover damages for any sort of
mental distress in a negligence case without a physical injury. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS 361 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEaTON]. see infra note 33 (discussing
physical injury requirement). Courts generally do not require a plaintiff to have a physical
injury to recover for mental distress when the defendant's conduct is intentional, reckless or
outrageous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville
19881
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals employed the reasonable and genuine
fear standard in Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc.' 5 In Hagerty the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the plaintiff, Hagerty,
could recover for reasonable and genuine fear of contracting cancer. 16 In
Hagerty defective loading equipment spilled dripolene, a carcinogenic chem-
ical, on Hagerty as he worked on the defendant's barge. 7 As a result of
the exposure to dripolene, Hagerty immediately experienced dizziness and
leg cramps.' The following day Hagerty felt stinging in his extremities.' 9
Hagerty knew that dripolene was a carcinogen, and he consulted a doctor
who advised Hagerty to seek periodic testing for cancer. 20 Hagerty ultimately
left his job, fearing further exposure to the carcinogen. 2' Although Hagerty
had no cancer at the time of the suit, he sought damages for fear of
developing cancer.22 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground
that Hagerty's cause of action had not accrued.2 3 The plaintiff appealed the
district court's grant of summary judgment.2 4
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff can recover for fear of
cancer without physical injury when defendant's conduct is wilful, gross, or wanton), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 3330 (1986); Payton v. Abbot Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171,
175-176 (1982) (stating that physical injury is not required for emotional distress where
defendant's conduct is extreme, outrageous and either intentional or reckless).
15. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
16. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1986).
17. Id. In Hagerty the defective loading equipment on the barge later spilled dripolene




21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. at 316. In Hagerty the plaintiff also sought to recover damages for an increased
risk of contracting cancer in the future, as well as the medical expenses from monitoring the
onset of any cancer. Id. at 319. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the risk of developing
cancer was greater than 50%, the court held that the plaintiff did not state a claim for possible
development of cancer. Id.; see infra notes 88-152 and accompanying text (discussing recovery
of damages for disease that has not yet developed). Addressing the plaintiffs claim for the
cost of continuing medical examinations, the Hagerty court noted that a plaintiff ordinarily
may recover for any reasonable medical expenses resulting from an injury. Hagerty, 788 F.2d
at 319. Further, the court stated that a plaintiff must mitigate his damages with medical
treatment. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the cost of the plaintiff's medical examinations
was a valid element of recovery. Id.; see Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83
(3rd Cir. 1986) (allowing asbestosis sufferer to recover damages for cost of medical surveillance
to monitor onset of cancer); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J.Super. 561, 572, 573,
461 A.2d 184, 190 (allowing plaintiffs exposed to toxic wastes to recover damages for medical
surveillance, even though future injury from exposure was not probable), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
23. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 316. After the district court in Hagerty granted summary
judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Id. The circuit court decided that Hagerty's cause of action accrued when
Hagerty suffered an injury from his exposure to dripolene. Id. at 317. The circuit court held
that the dizziness, leg cramps, and stinging Hagerty felt after his exposure to dripolene
presented an issue of physical injury and made summary judgement improper. Id.
24. Id.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted that under traditional tort rules the plaintiff could recover damages
from the defendant for all past, present and probable future harm resulting
from the exposure to dripoleneY The court acknowledged that if Hagerty's
present fear of cancer was reasonable and genuine and related to the
defendant's negligent act, damages could include mental anguish. 26 The
court determined that whether the plaintiffs fear was reasonable and genuine
was an issue of fact for the jury.27 The Hagerty court, therefore, held that
the physical effects the dripolene had had on the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
knowledge that dripolene was a carcinogen, and the plaintiff's concern over
25. Id.
26. Id. at 318. The court reasoned that Hagerty's fear of cancer was a present fact,
even though the cancer itself was speculative. Id.
The plaintiff's fear of a future disease may be reasonable and genuine even though the
plaintiff's chance of developing the disease is low. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765
F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that fear of cancer is compensable, even if cancer is
not medically probable); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (holding that fear of cancer can be reasonable even where likelihood of cancer is
low); Heider v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 231 S.2d 438, 441-42 (La.App.
1970) (holding that plaintiff could recover for mental anguish arising from 2% to 5% risk of
becoming epileptic); Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, -, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (1964)
(stating that fear of cancer need only have reasonable basis); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d
16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1958) (holding that plaintiff must establish a basis for fear of
cancer, but need not prove cancer will develop); Murphy v. Penn-Fruit Co., 274 Pa.Super.
427, 436, 418 A.2d 480, 485 (1980) (holding that plaintiff could recover for fear of cancer
and heart attack even though fear was unfounded medically).
In Wetherill v. University of Chicago the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois considered the requirements for recovery for fear of future cancer. Wetherill
v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D.IUl 1983). In Wetherill the plaintiffs
sued the defendants for the plaintiffs' pre-natal exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES), a carcin-
ogen. Id. at 1556. Though the plaintiffs did not have cancer at the time of trial, the plaintiffs
sued for the fear of developing cancer as a result of exposure to DES. Id. at 1559. The
plaintiffs wished to introduce evidence that DES was a carcinogen. Id. The defendants argued
that since cancer was not reasonably certain to develop from the plaintiffs' exposure to DES,
the plaintiff's fear of cancer was not compensable and, therefore, was irrelevant. Id. Accord-
ingly, the defendants sought to exclude evidence of the causal relationship between DES and
cancer. Id.
The Wetherill court noted that the concept of proximate cause demanded only a reasonable
foreseeability of an injury. Id. Consequently, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' anxiety
only had to be reasonable for the plaintiffs to recover damages for fear of cancer. Id. The
court further reasoned that requiring cancer to be reasonably certain before the plaintiffs could
recover damages for fear of cancer would distort traditional notions of proximate cause. Id.
Because of the causal relationship between DES and cancer, the court concluded, the plaintiff's
fear of cancer was reasonable. Id. The Wetherill court held, therefore, that the defendant's
evidence of the relationship between DES and cancer -was admissible. Id.
27. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986); see Clark
v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (Ist Cir. 1983) (upholding jury award for plaintiff's fear of cancer);
Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that
whether plaintiff's fear is reasonable is question of fact for jury); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 253, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (1958) (upholding jury award for
plaintiff's fear of cancer).
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future exposure to carcinogens, which led the plaintiff to quit his job,
supported Hagerty's cause of action against L & L Marine Services for fear
of contracting cancer.28
Just as a reasonable and genuine fear of cancer constitutes a present
injury, a reasonable and genuine fear of AIDS is a present injury, even
though development of AIDS is speculative.2 To collect damages for fear
of AIDS under the Hagerty rationale, an HIV carrier must prove that his
fear of AIDS is genuine and reasonable. 30 Because the risk of developing
AIDS from an HIV infection is substantial, an HIV carrier will have little
28. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318-319 (5th Cir. 1986); see
also Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence of plaintiff's
immediate physical discomfort after exposure to carcinogen and expert testimony about possible
effects of carcinogen supported jury finding that plaintiff's fear of cancer was reasonable and
genuine).
29. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
that plaintiff's fear of cancer was present injury, even though cancer was speculative); see also
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between AIDS and cancer).
30. See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 318 (stating that plaintiff must show reasonable and genuine
fear to recover damages for fear of cancer). In addition to meeting the reasonable fear
standard, a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for fear of cancer may have a duty to mitigate
his fear. See Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 78-79, 179 A.2d 401, 413 (1962)
(recognizing plaintiff's duty to mitigate fear of cancer). In Lorenc the plaintiff sued the
defendant chemical company for the defendant's negligent packaging of a chemical, which
resulted in severe chemical burns on the plaintiff's hands. Id. at 58, 179 A.2d at 404. The
plaintiff testified that because the burns did not heal properly, he feared the cancer would
develop on the burned skin. Id. at 74, 179 A.2d at 410. No scientific evidence suggested that
the chemical was a carcinogen. Id. However, chronic festering of the skin, such as the plaintiff
experienced, indicated potential malignancy. Id. The plaintiff refused to undergo a skin graft
of the affected areas, though a successful graft probably would have eliminated the prospect
of cancer. Id. at 75, 179 A.2d at 411. The trial court submitted to the jury the question of
what effect the plaintiff's fear of cancer and the plaintiff's failure to submit to surgery should
have on the plaintiff's claim for damages. Id. at 78, 179 A.2d at 412. The jury returned a
verdict of $25,000 in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 58, 179 A.2d at 404.
On appeal, the defendant charged that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider
testimony about the plaintiff's fear of cancer. Id. at 76, 179 A.2d at 411. The defendants
argued that the trial court should have excluded the cancer evidence because the plaintiff had
not mitigated his fear of cancer by treating his physical injury to avoid developing cancer. Id.
at 77, 179 A.2d at 412. The Supreme Court for the State of New Jersey acknowledged that a
plaintiff in personal injury action has a duty to exercise ordinary care to seek medical treatment
to relieve his pain and disability. Id. at 78, 179 A.2d at 412. The court noted, however, that
a plaintiff does not have an absolute duty to undergo surgical treatment to mitigate his
damages. Id. The court stated that a plaintiff reasonably may refuse surgery if the surgery
probably would be dangerous, extraordinarily painful or unsuccessful. Id. at 78, 179 A.2d at
413. The court stated that whether the plaintiff's failure to undergo surgery was reasonable
was an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Id. at 79, 179 A.2d at 413. The court further
stated that the effect of the plaintiff's failure to mitigate his fear on the plaintiff's claim was
also an issue for the jury. Id. The court held, therefore, that the trial court properly submitted
the cancer evidence to the jury. Id. at 81, 179 A.2d at 413.
A duty to mitigate would have little effect on an HIV carrier's suit for fear of AIDS
because no current medical procedures can lessen an HIV carrier's risk of contracting AIDS.
See supra note I (stating that no vaccine or cure for AIDS exists or is likely to exist in next
10 years).
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difficulty proving that his fear of AIDS is genuine and reasonable. 3' An
HIV carrier who establishes that his fear of AIDS is reasonable and genuine
should be able to collect damages for fear of AIDS if the carrier also can
show that HIV infection is a physical injury.32
The plaintiff must establish a physical injury because most jurisdictions
require a physical injury in claims for mental anguish.33 Courts adhere to
31. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 8 (estimating that 40% of HIV carriers will develop
AIDS); SURGEON GEmAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (estimating that 20% to 30% of
HIV carriers will develop AIDS within five years). An ordinary person carrying HIV will fear
AIDS. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (stating
that ordinary person exposed to drug that causes cancer would reasonably fear cancer);
Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (given widespread occurrence of
breast cancer, plaintiff's fear that cancer would develop from injury to breast is reasonable)
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-253, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000
(stating that doctor's restatement to plaintiff of common lay knowledge that burn wounds
which do not heal frequently become cancerous guaranteed validity of plaintiff's fear of
cancer).
In addition to establishing that the relationship between HIV and AIDS would cause a
reasonable HIV carrier to fear AIDS, the plaintiff might present witnesses to testify about the
plaintiff's emotional reaction to the HIV infection, or the plaintiff's expressions of fear. See
Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that testimony of two witnesses to
whom plaintiff expressed fear of cancer supported damages for fear of cancer).
32. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that plaintiff could recover damages for fear of cancer because plaintiff's fear was reasonable
and plaintiff had physical injury); supra note 12 (listing cases that have allowed plaintiff to
recover damages for fear of cancer if fear is reasonable and plaintiff has physical injury). The
Hagerty court's initial opinion said that the plaintiff could recover damages for serious mental
distress with or without physical injury. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 318. On reconsideration, however,
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed earlier Fifth Circuit opinions adhering to the physical
injury requirement, holding that the Hagerty court had assumed that the plaintiff had an
actionable injury independent from the plaintiff's mental distress. Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Servs., Inc., 797 F.2d 256, 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
33. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982)
(holding that plaintiff must suffer physical harm to recover damages for negligent infliction
of mental distress); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J.Super 561, 571, 461 A.2d 184,
189 (1983) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for fear of cancer because plaintiff had
no present physical injury), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987);
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that
plaintiff could not recover damages for negligent infliction of mental disturbance without
physical injury or some other independent basis for tort liability); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A (1965) (stating that actor not liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress
without bodily harm or other compensable damage); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at
361 (noting that great majority of courts will not allow plaintiff to recover damages for
negligent infliction of mental disturbance without physical harm). Courts adhering to the
physical injury requirement will not allow a plaintiff to recover damages for mental injury
without objective physical evidence that the plaintiff has suffered an injury. Payton v. Abbott
Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982). Only a handful of jurisdictions have
abandoned the physical injury requirement altogether. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical
Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (repudiating physical injury requirement because
requirement was medically unrealistic); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916,
928, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838, (1980) (rejecting physical injury requirement
because requirement ineffectively screened false claims and encouraged distorted pleading and
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 45:185
the physical injury requirement for three reasons.14 The first reason is to
prevent false or imaginary claims by providing objective physical evidence
to substantiate the plaintiff's mental distress.35 The second reason is to
testimony); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tele. Co., 175 Conn. 337, -, 398 A.2d
1180, 1184 (1978) (holding that recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress does not
depend on physical injury); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, -, 472 P.2d 509, 519-520
(1970) (recognizing that duty to refrain from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is
independent of duty to avoid infliction of physical harm); Sinn v. Burd 486 Pa. 146, ,
404 A.2d 672, 679 (1979) (rejecting physical injury requirement as artificial bar to recovery
where plaintiff could establish authenticity of mental distress by other methods).
Formerly, a majority of courts held that a plaintiff could not recover damages for
mental distress unless the defendant's negligence caused some physical impact that had a
physical effect on the plaintiff. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 363. To accomodate
worthy claims, courts expanded the physical impact requirement to the point where any impact,
even if very slight and totally unrelated to the harm the plaintiff suffered, would satisfy the
physical impact requirement. Payton, 386 Mass. at -, 437 N.E.2d at 176; PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 14, at 363. Today, most jurisdictions have dropped the physical impact
requirement and only require the plaintiff to show a physical injury to recover damages for
mental distress. Payton, 386 Mass. at _, 437 N.E.2d at 177; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, at 363.
Under the physical injury requirement, the plaintiff's physical harm does not have to
result from a physical impact. Payton, 386 Mass. at _ , 437 N.E.2d at 178; REsTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(1) (1965). Physical harm resulting from emotional stress satisfies
the physical injury requirement, even if the defendant's negligence caused no physical impact
on the plaintiff. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(1) (1965). For instance, a negligent
automobile driver who frightens a pregnant woman into a miscarriage is liable under the
physical injury requirement, even though the automobile did not touch the woman. Id. at §
436A, comment a. Of course, physical injury that does result from physical impact satisfies
the physical injury requirement as well. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781
F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that respiratory disorder resulting from impact of
asbestos fibers on plaintiff's lungs satisfies physical injury requirement) cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
3339 (1986); Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that physical discomfort
resulting from impact of chemical on plaintiff's skin satisfies physical injury requirement);
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F.Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984) (holding that damage to
plaintiff's chromosomes resulting from impact of radioactive gas on plaintiff satisfies the
physical injury requirement).
Although the physical injury requirement is not as strict as the physical impact requirement,
any physical impact which satisfies the physical impact requirement and produces a physical
effect on the plaintiff will satisfy the physical injury requirement. See, e.g., Jackson, 781 F.2d
at 414 (holding that respiratory disorder resulting from impact of asbestos fibers on plaintiff's
lungs satisfies physical injury requirement); Clark, 710 F.2d at 14 (holding that physical
discomfort resulting from impact of chemical on plaintiff's skin satisfies physical injury
requirement); Brafford, 586 F.Supp. at 17 (holding that damage to plaintiff's chromosomes
resulting from impact of radioactive gas on plaintiff satisfies physical injury requirement).
Because physical impact is sufficient but not necessary to satisfy the physical injury requirement,
the few courts which still apply the physical impact requirement implicitly apply the physical
injury requirement as well. See McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co. 638 F.Supp. 1173, 1175 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (equating physical injury requirement and physical impact requirement). As a result,
this note refers to the physical injury requirement even in cases where the court refers to the
physical impact requirement.
34. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for physical injury
requirement).
35. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982)
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prevent burdening both defendants and courts with claims for temporary
or trivial mental distress. 6 The third reason is to avoid burdening merely
negligent defendants with liability for remote consequences of wrongful
acts.37
Courts generally apply the physical injury requirement liberally. 8 Many
courts have allowed a very slight physical injury to satisfy the physical
injury requirement.3 9 For example, in Plummer v. United States40 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered what level of
physical injury is necessary to support a suit for the fear of contracting a
latent disease. 4' In Plummer the plaintiffs, prisoners in a federal penitentiary,
shared a cell with an inmate suffering from tuberculosis. 42 Although the
plaintiffs had no symptoms of the disease, dormant bacteria that could later
develop into tuberculosis had infected the plaintiffs. 43 The plaintiffs sought
to recover damages for fear of contracting tuberculosis. 4 In Plummer the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claim for fear of tuberculosis, reasoning that none of
the plaintiffs had demonstrated the physical injury necessary for a claim
for mental anguish.45 The plaintiffs appealed the district court's holding to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 4
6
The Third Circuit in Plummer noted that the purpose of the physical
injury requirement is to prevent false and imaginary claims.47 The circuit
(stating that physical injury requirement prevents false and imaginary claims by requiring
objective evidence to substantiate the plaintiff's mental distress); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 14, at 360-61 (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436A, comment b (same).
36. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982)
(stating that physical injury requirement prevents claims for temporary or trivial mental
distress); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 360-61 (same); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS, § 436A, comment b (same).
37. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, __ , 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982)
(stating that physical injury requirement protects merely negligent defendants from liability for
remote consequences of wrongful acts); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 360-61 (same);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, §436A, comment b (same).
38. See infra note 39 (discussing courts that have allowed very slight physical injury to
satisfy physical injury requirement).
39. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984)
(holding that damage to chromosomes satisfies physical injury requirement); Wetherill v. Univ.
of Chicago, 565 F.Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that prenatal exposure to harmful
drug satisfies physical injury requirement); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728, 733-
734 (1979) (holding that any mental injury which jury objectively can determine satisfies
physical injury requirement); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434
(Tenn. 1982) (holding that drinking polluted water satisfies physical injury requirement).
40. 580 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1978).




45. Id. at 74.
46. Id. at 73.
47. Id. at 76.
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court further determined that under Pennsylvania case law, any physical
injury, however slight, is sufficient to support a claim for mental suffering.4
The court noted that bacteria had infected the plaintiffs.49 The court
reasoned that even if the current effect of the bacteria was slight, the
bacteria eventually could cause a deadly disease. 50 The court held, therefore,
that the infection with dormant bacteria satisfied the traditional physical
injury requirement and supported the plaintiffs' claim for mental anguish.5'
Under the reasoning of the Plummer court, an HIV carrier should be
able to establish that his HIV infection is a physical injury that will support
a claim for fear of AIDS. 52 Like tuberculosis bacteria, HIV is a foreign
organism that can lie dormant in a person and later develop into a lethal
disease.5 3 Although a person cannot see or feel an HIV infection, a doctor
can-document an HIV infection and present objective evidence of potential
harm to the HIV carrier. 4 Because courts consistently have found that very
slight physical effects that have devastating potential satisfy the physical
injury requirement, an HIV carrier should be able to satisfy the physical
injury requirement.
5
Courts consistently have allowed a plaintiff to recover for the present
fear of contracting cancer in the future if the plaintiff can satisfy the
reasonable fear standard and the physical injury requirement.5 6 An HIV
carrier, therefore, may be able to recover for the present fear of AIDS if





52. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (stating that HIV attacks human immune
system and may cause death).
53. See supra note 4 and accompaying text (stating that HIV may lie dormant for lengthy
incubation Ieriod, frequently developing into AIDS); supra note 43 and accompanying text
(stating that tubercle bacteria can lie dormant for lengthy incubation period and later cause
deadly disease).
54. See infra note 59 (discussing objective tests that can determine the presence of HIV
in person's blood).
55. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3rd Cir. 1987) (holding that
infection by presently harmless bacteria satisfies physical injury requirement); Brafford v.
Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984) (holding that undocumented
subcellular changes in plaintiffs resulting from exposure to radon gas could satisfy physical
injury requirement); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D.Ill.
1983) (holding that plaintiffs' prenatal exposure to drug satisfies physical injury requirement);
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that exposure
to polluted water satisfies physical injury requirement); supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text (discussing Plummer court's holding that infection by dormant bacteria can satisfy physical
injury requirement); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing potentially fatal effects
of HIV on HIV carrier).
56. See supra note 12 (listing courts that have allowed plaintiffs meeting reasonable fear
standard and physical injury requirement to recover damages for fear of cancer and other
diseases).
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fear standard and the physical injury requirement.57 Furthermore, a person
exposed to HIV who is not an HIV carrier may be able to recover damages
for fear of developing AIDS before the person found that he did not carry
HIV.5 s HIV can remain undetected in the human body for more than a
year.5 9 Blood tests that determine the presence of HIV in a person's body
are only certain fourteen months after the HIV exposure occurs. 0 A person
exposed to HIV, therefore, may have a cause of action for his past fear
during the fourteen month interlude between the person's exposure to HIV
and the person's discovery that he does not carry HIV. 6'
To recover damages for past fear of AIDS, a plaintiff would have to
meet the physical injury requirement and the reasonable fear standard for
his past fear. 62 For example, in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.6
the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether plaintiffs could recover
damages for past fear of deyeloping cancer after tests had proved that the
57. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (noting similarities between carcinogens
and HIV and arguing that methods courts employ to allow plaintiffs to recover for fear of
cancer apply to an HIV carrier's suit for fear of AIDS).
58. See supra notes 57-82 and accompanying text (arguing that person exposed to HIV
may recover for fear of AIDS prior to discovering that he does not carry HIV).
59. Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 2. Doctors commonly use two tests to establish
the presence of HIV in a person's blood. MOBUIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 2, at 176.
The first test for HIV infection is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Id. ELISA
tests are highly sensitive and often produce false positive results. Fatteh, supra note 1, at 11.
After repeated positive ELISA tests, medical researchers confirm the HIV infection with a
Western blot test or an immuno flourescent assay. MOBIZNG AGAnsST AIDS, supra note 2,
at 176. Both the Western blot test and the immuno flourescent assay are less sensitive but
more specific than ELISA tests. Id. The tests reveal the presence of HIV in a person's blood,
but do not diagnose a case of AIDS. Fatteh, supra note 1, at 11. Doctors diagnose AIDS by
uncovering the presence of opportunistic diseases that indicate a failure of the immune system.
SURGEON GEaNaAL's REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
Researchers previously thought the ELISA test revealed the presence of HIV in a person's
blood two to 12 weeks after infection. See id. at 10 (stating that tests can detect HIV antibodies
two weeks to three months after infection). More recent studies suggest that a person can
carry HIV for up to fourteen months and still show negative test results for HIV antibodies.
Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
60. E. FINEBERG, AIDS IMPAcT ON PUBLic PoLIcY 19 (1986) (noting that during interlude
between exposure to HIV and development of antibodies, person exposed to HIV will not
know if he carries HIV).
61. See supra note 31-32 (discussing HIV carrier's reasonable fear of developing AIDS).
Scientists do not know how great an exposure to HIV is necessary to transmit the virus. Wash.
Post, Oct. 2, 1987, at A9, col. 2. Certain contact with an HIV carrier, however, creates a
high risk of infection with HIV. SURGEON GENE.AL's REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15. Therefore,
a person expsosed to HIV reasonably will fear contracting AIDS for fourteen months, until
tests can establish that the person's exposure to HIV did not result in infection with HIV. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing interlude between exposure to HIV and
development of antibodies to HIV, during which person exposed to HIV will not know whether
he carries HIV).
62. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing physical injury requirement
for past fear of cancer); infra, note 72 (discussing reasonable fear standard for past fear of
cancer).
63. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
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plaintiffs had no cancer. 64 In Laxton the defendant, Orkin, negligently
contaminated the plaintiff's water supply with chlordane, a carcinogenic
chemical. 65 The plaintiffs subsequently drank the contaminated water and
used the contaminated water for normal household purposes.6 After learning
that the water was contaminated, Mr. and Mrs. Laxton feared that the
chlordane would harm their family. 67 Approximately one year after Orkin
originally contaminated the Laxton's water supply, only one month after
the Laxtons understood the risks from exposure to chlordane, test results
proved that the chemical had had no effect on any member of the family. 6
Although the Laxtons suffered no physical damage as a result of exposure
to chlordane, they sought damages for the past fear of contracting cancer. 69
The Tennessee Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's award of damages
for the plaintiffs' mental anguish, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court.
70
The Supreme Court in Laxton recognized that under Tennessee law a
plaintiff could recover for mental distress only after showing a physical
injury.7' Nonetheless, the Tennessee court noted that a minimum showing
of physical injury could support recovery on claims of mental anguish.7 2
The Laxton court felt that drinking polluted water was sufficient physical
injury to support an award for mental anguish, even though medical tests
revealed no further physical injury from the contaminated water. 73 The
64. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 431 (Tenn. 1982).
65. Id. at 432. The plaintiffs in Laxton lived in a rural area and drew water from an
underground spring. Id. The defendant's serviceman sprayed the grounds around the plaintiff's
house with a termite pesticide that contained chlordane and other chemicals. Id. The pesticide
leached into the plaintiff's spring and contaminated the water with chlordane. Id.
66. Id. In Laxton Mr. Laxton took several showers and Mrs. Laxton washed an occasional
load of clothes. Id.
67. Id. at 433.
68. Id. at 433. In Laxton the plaintiffs obtained a new water supply after discovering
that their previous water source was polluted with chlordane: Id. After the plaintiffs had the
second water source, the chlordane posed no further threat. Id. The Tennessee court offered
no explanation of why chlordane presented no latent threat to the Laxtons. See id. (stating
that single blood test established that chlordane had not harmed plaintiffs).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 431-32. The Laxton trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue
of the defendant's negligence and submitted the issues of causation and damages to the jury.
Id. at 431. The jury returned a verdict of $12,721 in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. The verdict
included damages for the plaintiff's mental anguish. Id. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals reversed the damages for mental anguish, holding that the plaintiffs had not suffered
a physical injury. Id. at 432.
71. Id. at 433.
72. Id. at 434.
73. Id. The Laxton court did not specifically address the reasonable fear standard. Id.
The Tennessee court, however, approved the trial judge's instruction to the jury that upon a
finding of physical injury, any attendant mental pain is compensable. Id. Although the Laxton
court's opinion does not completely foreclose recovering damages for unreasonable fear, a
plaintiff seeking damages for past fear of a future disease probably will have to meet the
reasonable fear standard. See supra notes 13 and 26 and accompanying text (discussing accepted
application of reasonable fear standard to claims for fear of future disease).
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court held that the Laxtons could recover damages for the fear of cancer
after learning of the danger from chlordane, and before tests dispelled any
fear of cancer. 74
Under the court's analysis in Laxton, an uninfected person who was
exposed to HIV75 should be able to recover for the fear of AIDS the person
suffered before discovering that he did not carry HIV.76 Although the
74. Laxion, 639 S.W.2d at 434.
75. See SuRGiEoN GENERAL'S RiEPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that HIV carrier cannot
transmit HIV through casual contact such as sharing utensils and non-sexual touching). Only
sexual contact with an HIV carrier, or exposure to an HIV carrier's contaminated blood creates
a substantial risk of transmitting HIV. Id. at 21.
76. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (noting similarities between exposure to
HIV and exposure to carcinogens). Courts have allowed recovery for past fear that never
materialized in contexts other than cancer. See Fehely v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, __ , 135
P.2d 283, 291 (1943) (allowing plaintiff to recover damages for fear of harm to plaintiff's
unborn child, even though child was born unharmed).
In Fehely v. Senders the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon considered whether a
pregnant plaintiff's fear that a personal injury might harm her unborn child was an element
of damage even though the plaintiff's fear proved to be groundless. Id. at -, 135 P.2d at
283. The plaintiff in Fehely was six months pregnant when she suffered injuries in an automobjle
accident. Id. The plaintiff's physical injuries included various bruises and cuts and a blow to
the abdomen from the steering wheel of the car. Id. After a physician advised the plaintiff to
avoid certain activities and to remain in bed for two weeks after the accident, the plaintiff
feared that the injury might harm her unborn child. Id. The plaintiff's baby, however, was
born normal. Id. The plaintiff sought damages for her personal injuries and her past fear that
her injuries had harmed her unborn baby. Id. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court
admitted evidence of the plaintiff's past fear of an abnormal childbirth. Id. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court
first noted that a plaintiff may recover damages for mental distress that flows as a natural
consequence directly from physical injuries resulting from the defendant's negligence. Id. at
, 135 P.2d at 285. The court determined that the plaintiff's fear for her unborn child
was the natural consequence of the injury to the pregnant plaintiff's abdomen. Id. at -,
135 P.2d at 290. The court stated that the plaintiff's mental anguish was reasonable, even
though the plaintiff's fear proved to be unfounded when the plaintiff gave birth to a healthy
child. Id. Therefore, the court recognized that the extent of the plaintiff's suffering, and the
proper compensation for the plaintiff's suffering, were questions *of fact for the jury. Id.
Accordingly, the court held that the trial judge did not err in submitting the question of the
plaintiff's past mental suffering to the jury. Id. at -, 135 P.2d at 291; see also, e.g.
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (allowing
plaintiff to recover damages for fear of harm to plaintiff's unborn child, even though child
born unharmed); Carter v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 47 N.J. Super 379, 390, 136
A.2d 15, 22 (1957) (same); Elliot v. Arrowsmith, 149 Wash. 631, 635, 272 P. 32, 33 (1928)
(same).
Conversely, however, a plaintiff exposed to HIV probably would not be able to recover
damages for fear of AIDS the plaintiff experiences after blood tests establish that the plaintiff
does not carry HIV. Cf. Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 124-25, 52 S.E. 152,
153 (1905) (disallowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of injury from swallowed glass occurring
after removal of glass); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn.
1982) (disallowing recovery for fear of cancer occurring after medical diagnosis proved cancer
would not develop); Elliot v. Arrowsmith, 149 Wash. 631, 633-634, 272 P.2d 32, 33 (1928)
(disallowing recovery for plaintiff's fear of injury occurring after removal of conditions that
might cause injury). The finder of fact probably would determine that the plaintiff's fear of
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plaintiff no longer would fear developing AIDS, the plaintiff nonetheless
had feared AIDS for a specific period in the past.77 A negative blood test
proving that HIV has not entered the plaintiff's body does not erase the
plaintiff's past fear of AIDS. 78 Therefore, the uninfected plaintiff should
be able to establish that fearing AIDS while the plaintiff thought he was
an HIV carrier was reasonable. 79 Furthermore, under Laxton, the plaintiff's
exposure to HIV would satisfy the physical injury requirement.80 The
plaintiff could establish a physical injury because the plaintiff's exposure
to HIV is analogous to the Laxtons' exposure to chlordane.8s Because a
plaintiff who was exposed to HIV but not infected by HIV could establish
both a reasonable fear of AIDS and a physical injury, a court should allow
a person to recover damages for fear of AIDS for the period the person
thought he might carry HIV.
82
Given widespread acceptance that fear of cancer is a compensable injury,
courts should allow an HIV carrier to maintain a cause of action for both
past and present fear of AIDS. 3 Courts traditionally were reluctant to
recognize mental suffering as a compensable injury in anticipation of
uncertain, trivial and false claims.8 4 Courts, however, have reduced the
AIDS after a conclusively negative blood test is unreasonable and, therefore, is not actionable.
Cf. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986) (court held that
plaintiff could recover for fear of cancer only if fear was reasonable and genuine), see supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable fear standard of Hagerty).
77. See supra note 61 (arguing that person who reasonably believes that he is HIV carrier
will reasonably fear AIDS, even though belief later proves groundless).
78. Cf. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982)
(allowing plaintiff to recover for fear of cancer that later proved groundless); Fehely v. Senders,
170 Or. 457, -, 135 P.2d 283, 290 (1943) (allowing plaintiff to recover for past fear of
injury to unborn child, even though child was born healthy).
79. See supra note 61 (arguing that person exposed to HIV through sexual contact or
exposure to contaminated blood products reasonably may believe HIV infection has occurred);
see also supra note 31 and accompanying text (arguing that HIV carrier will reasonably fear
contracting AIDS).
80. Cf. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982)
(drinking water contaminated with carcinogen satisfies physical injury requirement); see also
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (noting similarities between HIV infection and exposure
to carcinogen).
81. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between exposure
to HIV and exposure to carcinogens).
82. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting widespread acceptance among
courts that plaintiff establishing physical injury can recover damages for reasonable fear of
future harm).
83. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting widespread acceptance of past and
present fear of cancer as actionable injury); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text
(discussing similarities between AIDS and cancer).
84. See, e.g., Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.App. 374,
56 N.E. 917, 923 (1899) (court held that damages for mental distress are too speculative to
be base for recovery); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E.2d 354, 355
(1896) (court held that mere fright did not constitute a personal injury); Ewing v. Pittsburgh,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 44, 23 A. 340, 340 (1892) (court held that defendant
had no duty to protect plaintiff from mental distress); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at
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problem of unworthy claims in the context of fear of a future disease by
requiring that the plaintiff's fear be reasonable and genuine and that the
plaintiff suffer physical injury.85 Most courts now agree that mental injury
can be as definite as physical injury.16 The possible consequences of an HIV
infection are so serious that a court should not dismiss an HIV carrier's
fear of AIDS as trivial or false?
7
In addition to recovering damages for the fear of developing AIDS, an
HIV carrier may be able to recover damages for contracting AIDS before
the carrier develops AIDS. 8 To an HIV carrier, AIDS is a prospective
disease that has not yet developed, but may develop.8 9 Although no court
has considered whether an HIV carrier may recover for prospective AIDS,
a majority of courts considering damages for a prospective cancer have
allowed plaintiffs to recover damages for prospective cancer if the plaintiff
can show more than a fifty percent chance of contracting cancer. 9° If the
plaintiff has less than a fifty percent chance of contracting cancer, courts
55 (noting that courts traditionally regarded mental pain too speculative to be compensable).
Recognizing mental distress as an actionable injury, courts have overruled traditional holdings
disallowing recovery for mental distress. See Kroger Co. v. Beck, 176 Ind.App. 202, ,
375 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1978) (recognizing mental distress as actionable injury in Indiana);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, -, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (1970) (overruling Ewing v.
Pittsburgh Ry.); Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1961) (overruling
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing modem
acceptance of mental distress as actionable injury).
85. See supra note 26 (discussing reasonable fear standard for claims of fear of future
harm); supra note 33 (discussing physical injury requirement for claims of menfal anguish).
86. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So.2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981)
(allowing- plaintiff to recover damages for mental anguish even though plaintiff suffered no
physical injury); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813,
821, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 839 (1980) (recognizing cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) (recognizing
emotional suffering as actionable injury); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d
249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958) (court recognized freedom from mental disturbance
as legally protected interest).
87. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing potentially fatal effects of
HIV infection); supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing ordinary person's reaction
to HIV infection).
88. See infra note 90 (listing courts allowing a plaintiff who meets a requisite standard
of proof to recover damages for cancer that has not yet developed); supra note 9-11 and
accompanying text (discussing similarities between cancer and AIDS).
89. See supra notes 2-4 accompanying text (discussing relationship between HIV and
AIDS).
90. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985)
(allowing plaintiff to recover for prospective cancer that is more likely than not to occur):
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411-412 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing
plaintiff to recover damages for greater than 50% chance of developing cancer) cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co. 645 F. Supp. 764, 769 (W.D.La.
1986) (allowing plaintiff to recover damages for prospective cancer more likely than not to
occur from asbestos exposure); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464
A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983) (holding that plaintiff could recover for prospective cancer if weight
of evidence indicated that cancer would develop from exposure to asbestos).
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generally do not allow the plaintiff to recover damages for prospective
cancer. 9' For example, in Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 92 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the plaintiff, Gideon, could
recover damages for prospective lung cancer. 93 In Gideon the plaintiff
handled asbestos products for nearly forty years as a part of his work for
insulation companies. 94 Gideon sought damages from several asbestos man-
ufacturers for the asbestosis he contracted from inhaling asbestos fibers
during the course of his employment. 95 At trial Gideon's expert witness
testified that Gideon's exposure to asbestos created a risk of cancer that
was greater than fifty percent. 96 The jury awarded Gideon damages of
$501,100. 97 The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, contending that the district court erred in allowing
91. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs. Co., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that plaintiff did not state cause of action for future development of cancer because
plaintiff did not allege cancer probably would develop in the future); Herber v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir. 1986) (denying plaintiffs recovery for prospective cancer
because development of cancer was not reasonable medical probability); Laswell v. Brown,
683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiff could not recover damages for mere
possibility of contracting cancer from genetic cellular damage) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210
(1983); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. II. 1978) (holding that
plaintiffs who alleged mere risk of developing cancer from exposure to diethylstilbestrol failed
to state cause of action); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill.App.3d 753, 761, 394 N.E.2d
1369, 1376 (1979) (refusing to recognize plaintiff's risk of developing cancer from exposure to
diethylstilbestrol as present injury because cancer was not reasonably certain to occur); Ayers
v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J.Super 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (1983) (holding that
plaintiffs could not recover damages for prospective cancer from exposure to toxic wastes
because plaintiffs failed to show cancer probably would develop), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987); Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1094
(Pa. 1985) (holding that trial court properly had excluded evidence of plaintiff's increased risk
of cancer from exposure to asbestos because development of cancer was not probable); see
also Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 55 Ill.App.3d 822, 829, 370 N.E.2d 826, 830
(1977) (stating that plaintiff could not recover damages for prospective rupture of disc because
future disc rupture was not reasonably certain to occur); Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d
42, 47 (Minn. 1977) (stating that to support award for prospective stroke, plaintiff must prove
stroke is reasonably certain to occur); Jolicoeur V. Conrad, 106 N.H. 496, - , 213 A.2d
912, 914 (1965) (holding that plaintiff could not recover damages for prospective bone
inflammation because plaintiff could not prove prospective condition more likely than not to
occur).
92. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
93. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1985).
94. Id.
95. Id. The plaintiff sued 17 defendants, all of whom manufactured asbestos products,
for contracting asbestosis, an inflammation of the lungs occurring in people who inhale
asbestos particles. Id.; see STEDMN'S MEDicAL DICnIONARY 128 (5th ed. 1982) (defining
asbestosis).
96. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138. The defendants' witnesses testified that the plaintiff did
not have a greater than 50076 chance of developing cancer. Id. at 1138.
97. Id. at 1134. The jury returned a verdict against seven of the defendants for $500,000,
awarded the plaintiff $1,000 in punitive damages against one of the defendants, and awarded
the defendant's wife $100 for loss of consortium. Id. The district court reduced the verdict to
$350,070 to reflect the plaintiff's settlement with three of the defendants. Id.
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evidence of Gideon's risk of cancer because Gideon did not have cancer at
the time of the trial.
98
Considering Gideon's claim for prospective cancer, the Fifth Circuit
stated that a plaintiff must recover all damages that result from a tort in
a single cause of action. 99 The court stressed that under the single cause of
action rule the plaintiff could not split the cause of action and seek damages
for later injuries in a second suit.' °° The court reasoned that Gideon's suit
had to cover damages for diseases that had developed and diseases that
could later develop. 01 The court noted that if a plaintiff has a less than
fifty percent chance of developing a prospective disease, the plaintiff could
not recover for the prospective disease because mere possibility does not
meet the preponderance of evidence standard.'l 2 The court determined that
to recover damages for prospective cancer, Gideon had to prove that cancer
was more likely than not to develop.10 3 The circuit court held, therefore,
that the district court properly admitted the evidence that Gideon had a
greater than fifty percent risk of developing cancer." 4
Under the standard the Fifth Circuit used in Gideon, an HIV carrier
could maintain a suit for prospective AIDS.' 05 However, given the divergence
of opinion among experts of an HIV carrier's chance of developing AIDS,
the HIV carrier may have difficulty establishing a greater than fifty percent
chance of contracting AIDS. 1 6 As the court noted in Gideon, the jury
would have to decide whether the plaintiff's chances of developing AIDS
98. Id. at 1136. In Gideon the defendants claimed that the district court erred on a
number of grounds other than admitting evidence of the plaintiff's risk of cancer. Id. at 1134.
The defendants challenged the competence of the plaintiff's expert witnesses and the sufficiency
of evidence on a number of issues. Id. The defendants also charged that the trial court erred
in instructing the jury concerning the plaintiff's mitigation of damages and alleged design
defects in the plaintiff's products. Id. at 1134-35. The Fifth Circuit in Gideon agreed that the
evidence was insufficient to establish the liability of two of the defendants. Id. at 1146.
Otherwise, the circuit court upheld the district court's actions. Id.
99. Id. at 1136.
100. Id. at 1137.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1137; see also Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir.
1986) (stating that purpose of reasonable probability standard is simply to provide compensation
for harm that is likely to occur and to deny compensation for harm that is not likely to
occur).
103. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138. The Gideon court further explained that the traditional
method of proving a prospective disease is to present expert testimony on the probability that
the prospective disease will develop. Id. The court stated that the expert testimony that Gideon
had a greater than 50% risk of dying from cancer was crucial to determining the extent of
Gideon's injury and the amount of Gideon's damages. Id. The court concluded that whether
the testimony was correct was an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1138 (holding that jury must decide whether plaintiff meets requisite
standard of proof to recover damages for prospective cancer); Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37
N.J. 56, 76, 179 A.2d 401, 411 (1962) (holding that whether or not plaintiff had stated cause
of action for prospective cancer was issue of fact for jury to decide).
106. See supra note 4 (discussing HIV carrier's chances of developing AIDS).
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:185
were over fifty percent. 107 If the HIV carrier could convince the jury that
he has a greater than fifty percent chance of developing AIDS, the HIV
carrier should be able to recover damages for prospective AIDS under the
standard of recovery that the Gideon court employed.
108
In contrast to the Gideon court's position, which allows the plaintiff
to recover for a prospective disease only when the plaintiff has a greater
than fifty percent chance of developing the disease, a minority of courts
have allowed plaintiffs with less than a fifty percent chance of developing
a prospective disease to recover damages for the increased risk of contracting
the prospective disease.Y°9 Furthermore, a number of courts have allowed a
107. See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138 (holding that plaintiff's chances of developing cancer
were issue of fact for jury to decide); see also infra note 109 (listing courts that have allowed
plaintiff to recover for less than 50% risk of contracting prospective disease).
108. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing established case law which
holds that plaintiff with greater than 50% chance of developing cancer can recover damages
for prospective cancer); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing similarities
between cancer and AIDS).
109. See, e.g., McCall v. United States, 206 F.Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (allowing
plaintiff to recover damages for 3% to 25% chance that plaintiff would develop epilepsy from
head injury); Davis v. Graviss 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984) (given substantial supporting
evidence, jury may compensate plaintiff for increased likelihood of brain disorders even though
disorders are mere possibility); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, -, 517 P.2d
675, 680 (1973) (stating that mere possibility of development of future condition could not,
standing alone, support award of damages, but could serve as basis for additional damages);
Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, -, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967) (holding that
$7500 verdict partially based on a five percent chance that injury would cause future seizures
not excessive); Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wash.2d 609,
614, 664 P.2d 474, 487 (1983) (stating that cancer patient could maintain cause of action
against hospital whose negligence reduced patient's chance of survival by fourteen percent);
see also Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 406, 471 A.2d 405, 415 (1984) (holding that plaintiff
who already had cancer could introduce evidence that defendant's negligence increased plain-
tiff's risk of cancer); Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, - , 431 A.2d 920, 925
(1981) (holding that plaintiff with breast cancer could recover damages for defendant's
negligence which increased plaintiff's risk of contracting cancer).
For example, in Schwegel v. Goldberg the Superior Court for the State of Pennsylvania
considered whether the jury could consider possible future effects of an injury when assessing
damages. Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, -, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967). In
Schwegel the defendant struck the plaintiff with an automobile. Id. at -, 228 A.2d. at
406. The plaintiff's expert witness testified that because of the brain injuries the plaintiff
suffered in the accident, the plaintiff had a five percent chance of developing seizures within
the next twenty years. Id. at -, 228 A.2d at 408. The jury awarded the plaintiff $7500
and the plaintiff's father $236. Id. at -, 228 A.2d at 406. The defendant appealed the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for a new trial. Id.
In support of the motion for a new trial, the defendant charged on appeal that the
testimony concerning the possible complications of the plaintiff's injury was speculative and
inadmissable. Id. The Schwegel court noted that the plaintiff's brain injury from the accident
was not speculative. Id. at -, 228 A.2d at 409. The court further determined that the
expert's statistical estimate of the plaintiff's chance of developing seizures was not speculative.
Id. The court stated that excluding possible future effects of an injury from the jury's
consideration would be unfair because the plaintiff had to sue within the statute of limitations
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plaintiff with less than a fifty percent chance of contracting the prospective
disease to maintain a separate cause of action after the prospective disease
develops, even if the disease develops after the normal statute of limitations
period has expired." 0 Courts allowing separate causes of action consider the
later development of the prospective disease a separate injury from the
physical injury that forms the basis of the plaintiff's present suit.- Ac-
and could bring only one action for all past, present, and future injuries. Id. Rather than
excluding medical evidence of the plaintiff's low risk of developing seizures altogether, the
court decided to rely on the amount of damages to determine whether the jury had accorded
the plaintiff's risk of seizures too much weight. Id. In view of the plaintiff's physical and
emotional injuries, the court felt the $7500 verdict reasonably reflected the plaintiff's relatively
low risk of developing seizures. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court had properly
admitted evidence of the plaintiff's increased risk of developing seizures. Id.
Commentators have argued that courts should allow a plaintiff with less than a 50%
chance of developing a prospective disease to recover damages for increased risk of developing
the disease. See, e.g., Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer,
15 Cu m. L. REv. 723, 742 (1985) (arguing that rejecting statistical evidence of increased risk
of cancer systematically undercompensates victims of serious injury); Note, Increased Risk of
Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REv. 563, 564 (1984) (arguing that recognizing less
than 50% risk of cancer is consistent with fundamental concern of tort law-allocation of
risk); King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1353, 1376-1380 (1981) (arguing that
drawing line for recovery of damages for increased risk of cancer at 50% arbitrarily denies
recovery for statistically demonstrable injury and subverts basic rules and objectives of tort
law).
110. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir. 1986) (denying
plaintiff's claim for prospective cancer, but recognizing that plaintiff could maintain second
cause of action for exposure to asbestos when plaintiff developed cancer); Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing asbestosis and cancer
as separate diseases and holding that plaintiff's cause of action for cancer would accrue when
plaintiff developed cancer); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3rd Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (holding that plaintiff could recover for cancer and
phlebitis from single exposure to drug in separate actions); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 296 Md. 656, 668-69, 464 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1983) (recognizing asbestosis and cancer
as separate injuries and holding that cause of action for lung cancer accrues when plaintiff
discovers or should discover cancer); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 556,
565, 495 A.2d 495, 500 (1985) (denying plaintiff's claim for increased risk of cancer, but
holding that plaintiff had right to sue again if cancer later developed); Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 189 N.J.Super 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (1983) (denying plaintiffs' claim for
prospective cancer from exposure to toxic wastes, but recognizing plaintiffs' right to maintain
separate cause of action for cancer if plaintiffs developed cancer in the future) aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 556, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). But see, Graffagnino v. Fibreboard Corp.
776 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing plaintiff only one cause of action for all injuries
from exposure to asbestos); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff suing for asbestosis could not recover damages for cancer in
later suit); Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (court
held that plaintiff suing defendant for asbestosis could not bring second claim against same
defendant for cancer, even if plaintiff could not have discovered cancer until after first suit),
aff'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3rd Cir 1982).
111. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 684 F.2d 111, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding that asbestosis and cancer from same exposure to asbestos were separate injuries);
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3rd Cir. 1976) (holding that phlebitis
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cordingly, the courts allow the plaintiff to maintain a suit for the disease
after the disease develops, regardless of the statute of limitations for the
original injury or an earlier suit for the original injury.112 The statute of
limitations for a cause of action for the prospective disease does not begin
to run until the disease develops." 3
For example, in Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp.1 4 the Superior Court
for the State of New Jersey considered whether the plaintiffs could recover
damages for increased risk of developing cancer." '5 In Devlin the plaintiffs
were truckdrivers and shipyard workers who handled asbestos in the course
of their jobs."16 The plaintiffs sued the defendant asbestos manufacturers
for damages from the asbestosis that the plaintiffs contracted during their
employment." 7 Although the plaintiffs did not have cancer, the plaintiffs
included in their suit claims for damages for the increased risk of lung
cancer from asbestos exposure."8 None of the plaintiffs had a greater than
fifty percent chance of developing cancer.' 9 The defendants argued that the
statute of limitations would bar the plaintiffs' suit for cancer damages if
the plaintiffs failed to sue within two years after the plaintiffs discovered
the development of asbestosis.' 20 Alternatively, the defendants maintained
that if the plaintiffs sued within the statute of limitations but could not
prove that the chance of future cancer was greater than fifty percent, the
single cause of action rule would not allow the plaintiffs to sue when the
cancer developed.'
2'
The Superior Court of New Jersey determined that the plaintiffs could
not meet the standard of proof necessary to recover for a prospective disease
because the plaintiffs did not have a greater than fifty percent chance of
contracting cancer. 22 The court further noted that New Jersey law did not
allow the plaintiffs to recover for increased risk of cancer when the risk of
developing cancer was less than fifty percent. 23 Addressing the defendants'
and cancer resulting from same exposure to drug were separate injuries), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1038 (1977); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 668, 464 A.2d 1020, 1027
(1983) (holding that asbestosis and cancer from same exposure to asbestos were separate
injuries); see also infra note 132 (discussing recognition of HIV infection and AIDS as separate
diseases).
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have allowed
plaintiffs to bring second suit for prospective disease after disease develops).
113. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have tolled statute
of limitations for prospective disease until disease develops).
114. 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
115. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super 556, 559, 495 A.2d 495, 497 (1985).
116. Id. at 559, n. 1, 495 A.2d at 495, n.1.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 559, 495 A.2d at 495.
119. Id. The plaintiffs in Devlin stipulated that they could not prove that they had a
greater than 50% chance of developing cancer. Id.
120. Id. at 568-69, 495 A.2d at 502.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 564-65, 495 A.2d at 499-500.
123. Id. at 564, 495 A.2d at 500. The Devlin court noted that no court in New Jersey
had allowed a plaintiff to recover for the increased risk of cancer standing alone. Id.
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argument that the statute of limitations and the single cause of action rule
barred the plaintiffs' suits, the court determined that a strict application of
the statute of limitations and the single cause of action rule effectively
would prevent suits by most of the plaintiffs in Devlin who later contracted
cancer from their exposure to asbestos. 24 The court explained that, under
the defendants' reasoning, the plaintiffs could recover damages for cancer
only if the plaintiffs sued within two years of discovering asbestosis and if
cancer developed during the pendency of the asbestosis suit.121
To avoid unfairly precluding a claim for cancer that already had
developed, the court recognized asbestosis and asbestos-related cancer as
separate injuries.126 The court decided that the cause of action for the
plaintiffs' prospective cancer did not accrue until cancer developed. 27 Con-
sequently, the court held that the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs'
cancer suit would not begin to run until the plaintiffs discovered or should
have discovered cancer.12 The court further noted that the single cause of
action rule does not preclude a second cause of action when the court in
the first action reserves the plaintiff's right to maintain a second action. 29
Consequently, although the court denied the plaintiffs' claim for increased
risk of cancer, the court held that the plaintiffs had a right to sue again
for exposure to asbestos if the plaintiffs later developed cancer from
exposure to asbestos. 30
A court following the Devlin rationale could allow an HIV carrier to
maintain a second cause of action for AIDS when AIDS develops if the
HIV carrier fails to establish a greater than fifty percent chance of devel-
oping AIDS in an initial suit for prospective AIDS.' A court considering
an HIV carrier's suit for AIDS could recognize HIV infection and AIDS
as separate injuries.3 2 The court could deny the HIV carrier's claim for





129. Id. The Devlin court also noted that a court may allow a plaintiff to maintain two
causes of action for a single tort when extraordinary circumstances overcome the policies that
favor preclusion of a second action. Id.
130. Id. at 500.
131. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing Devlin court allowing
plaintiff to maintain separate causes of action for asbestosis and cancer).
132. Cf. supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing Devlin court's recognition of
asbestosis and cancer as separate injuries). A court might hesitate to recognize an HIV infection
as an injury separate from AIDS because unlike cancer and asbestosis, which develop inde-
pendently of each other, AIDS develops from HIV. See supra note 4 (noting that HIV causes
AIDS). However, HIV can cause complications other than AIDS. See supra note 4 (noting
that HIV can cause AIDS-Related Complex and brain damage). In addition, an HIV infection
is arguably an actionable injury even if the HIV never develops into AIDS. Cf. Plummer v.
United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that infection with dormant tuberculosis
bacteria constituted physical injury); see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (arguing
that HIV infection is physical injury). Apart from the risk of developing AIDS, an HIV carrier
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prospective AIDS if the plaintiff's chance of developing AIDS is less than
fifty percent while specifically reserving the HIV carrier's right to sue again
if the plaintiff later develops AIDS. 33 The applicable statute of limitations,
therefore, would not begin to run until the HIV carrier discovers or should
discover that AIDS has developed . 34
The Devlin approach, however, is only practicable in jurisdictions that
have adopted the discovery rule for the statute of limitations. 35 Under the
discovery rule, the plaintiff's second cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff discovers or should discover cancer, and not when a carcinogen
enters the plaintiff's body. 136 A traditional application of the statute of
limitations, in which the statute runs from the time of the tort, may preclude
the plaintiff's second action before the plaintiff discovers, or even suffers
injury. 37 However, most jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule for
statutes of limitations. 138
cannot engage freely in sex, have children, or donate blood. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,
supra note 1, at 14, 20, 21 (Surgeon General warning HIV carriers not to engage in certain
activities). Furthermore, infection with HIV carries a significant social stigma. See AIDS:
LEGAL PoLicmas, supra note 1, at 3-5 (discussing nationwide paranoia over AIDS leading to
widespread refusal to associate with HIV carriers). Given the harmful effects of HIV on an
HIV carrier apart from the carrier's risk of contracting AIDS, a court should be able to
recognize HIV infection and AIDS as separate injuries. Cf. supra, note 110 (listing courts that
have recognized latent cancer as separate injury from initial injury resulting from effects of
carcinogen); supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between carcinogens
and HIV).
133. Cf. supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing Devlin court's denial of
plaintiff's cause of action for prospective cancer but reserving plaintiff's right to bring second
suit when cancer occurred).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Devlin court's application of
the discovery rule for the statute of limitations); infra note 136 (discussing discovery rule).
135. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing preclusion of suits for latent
disease by traditional application of statute of limitations).
136. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing adverse effects of traditional
application of statute of limitations on claim for latent disease). Courts traditionally have held
that the statute of limitation begins to run when damage occurs from the tort. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 14, at 165. Difficulties emerged in the areas of medical malpractice and
products liability for toxic drugs and chemicals, where the statutory period commonly ran out
before the plaintiff knew of any injury. Id. To avoid possible injustices under the traditional
application of the statute of limitations, courts and legislatures have adopted the discovery
rule, where the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or
should discover his injury. Id. at 166. The discovery rule is the modem trend in all areas of
tort law. Id. at 166-167. Nonetheless, since statutes of limitation are legislative creations, courts
must follow legislative instruction on when the statute begins to run. Id. at 167.
137. See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1013, 430 N.E.2d 1297,
1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981) (precluding plaintiffs' cause of action for asbestosis because
statute of limitations began to run from date of last exposure to asbestos) cert. denied, 456
U.S. 967 (1982); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 958, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981)
(holding that cause of action for asbestosis accrues when damage to lungs first occurs, even
if plaintiff could not have discovered damage).
138. See, e.g., Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, ... 411 N.E.2d 458, 460-61 (1980)
(adopting discovery rule for statute of limitations); Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 140-
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Even if a court applies the discovery rule to allow a plaintiff with a
prospective disease to maintain a separate cause of action once the pro-
spective disease develops, the Devlin court's approach, allowing the plaintiff
to split the claim for the prospective disease from the claim for the initial
injury, presents certain problems. 3 9 The Devlin approach leaves a defendant
vulnerable to a suit for many years because the plaintiff's second cause of
action will not accrue until the prospective disease develops, perhaps many
years after the first suit. 40 In addition, a long delay between the tort and
the trial decreases the availability of evidence and the reliability of testimony,
increasing the chances of an inaccurate factual determination.' 4' The speed
with which AIDS kills its victims is an additional factor weighing against
the splitting of an HIV carrier's claim.' 42 Both the defendant and the
plaintiff in a cause of action for AIDS are likely to die before the claim
comes to trial.
43
Although the Devlin court's position of allowing a plaintiff with a
prospective disease to split his claim against the defendant presents certain
problems, the Gideon court's approach of forcing a plaintiff with a pro-
spective disease to recover all damages for the prospective disease in a single
cause of action presents more serious disadvantages than the Devlin court's
approach.' 44 The single cause of action rule is poorly suited to cases of
latent disease. 4 Under Gideon a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate a greater
41, 363 A.2d 346, 350-51 (1976) (adopting discovery rule and noting that discovery rule is now
the majority rule in other states); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979) (stating
that statute of limitations begins to run when person knows or should know he has suffered
injury); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 166 (noting that many jurisdictions have adopted
discovery rule for statutes of limitations).
139. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with Devlin
court allowing plaintiff to split cause of action for prospective disease from claim for present
injury).
140. See supra note 4 (stating that AIDS may have latency period of over seven years);
supra note 11 (stating that cancer may have latency period of up to 40 years).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating that purpose
of statutes of limitations is to avoid cases in which absence of witnesses, fading memories,
and lost evidence impairs search for truth); Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir.
1978) (stating that statutes of limitations ensure prompt lititgation and accurate factual
determination); Byrne v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 276, 281 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(stating that litigants and courts should not be involved in actions in which passage of time
seriously may impair search for truth).
142. See infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of delaying suit
for development of AIDS).
143. See Fatteh, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that AIDS kills 16% of its victims within
three months of diagnosis, 23% within six months, 35% within one year, and 57% within
two years); supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that HIV carrier will
develop AIDS).
144. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing why Devlin court's approach
of allowing plaintiff suing for prospective disease to split claim is preferable to Gideon court's
approach of not allowing plaintiff with less than 50% chance of developing prospective disease
to recover damages for prospective disease).
145. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc. 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
that single cause of action rule tends to overcompensate or undercompensate claims for latent
disease).
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than fifty percent chance of developing a prospective disease must choose
between two unsatisfactory alternatives. 46 The plaintiff's first alternative is
to sue immediately for a comparatively minor injury. 47 If the plaintiff sues
immediately, however, the plaintiff will not be able to recover for the more
serious prospective disease. 48 The plaintiff's second alternative is to sue
when the prospective disease develops, but the statute of limitations then
may bar the plaintiff's cause of action.1 49 Accordingly, the Gideon approach
effectively prevents a plaintiff with less than a fifty percent chance of
developing a latent disease from recovering damages for the prospective
disease, even after the prospective disease develops. 50 While the Devlin
approach may make litigation more difficult by delaying causes of action
and consequently increasing the chances of inacurate factual determinations,
the Gideon approach may preclude worthy claims altogether."' Therefore,
if a plaintiff brings an action for prospective AIDS and the plaintiff's
chances of developing AIDS are less than fifty percent, the Devlin court's
position of claim splitting is preferable to the Gideon court's position of
denying the plaintiff's cause of action for prospective AIDS.
52
Whatever an HIV carrier's chance of contracting AIDS, the HIV carrier
should be able to maintain an immediate cause of action against the person
146. See Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 556, 568, 495 A.2d 495, 502
(1985) (stating that plaintiff who cannot split cause of action for asbestosis and cancer faces
"Catch-22" situation).
147. See id. (stating that plaintiff with prospective cancer faces two unsatisfactoy alter-
natives in bringing suit for cancer).
148. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating that majority of jurisdictions do
not allow plaintiff with less than 50% chance of developing prospective injury to recover
damages for prospective injury).
149. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing adverse effect of statute of
limitations on causes of action for latent diseases). Both cancer and AIDS may develop after
the applicable statute of limitations has run. See supra note 4 (stating that AIDS may lie
dormant for more than seven years); supra note 11 (stating that cancer may lie dormant for
40 years). If prospective AIDS or cancer does not develop before the statute of limitations
has run, the plaintiff will not be able to maintain an action for cancer or AIDS. See supra
note 137 and accompanying text (discussing adverse effect of statutes of limitations on causes
of action for latent diseases). In the alternative, the plaintiff's prospective disease may never
develop, in which case the plaintiff has foregone recovering damages for his initial injury. See
supra note 4 (stating that person with prospective case of AIDS may have only 20% to 40%
chance of developing AIDS).
150. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating that plaintiff who has sued for initial exposure to carcinogen may not bring second
suit when cancer develops); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super 556, 568, 495
A.2d 495, 500 (1985) (recognizing that if plaintiffs cannot split asbestosis and cancer claims,
plaintiffs effectively are precluded from recovering damages for cancer).
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that delaying suits increases
chances of inacurate factual determination); supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (arguing
that Gideon court's approach of not allowing plaintiff with latent disease to split claims
effectively prevents certain plaintiffs from recovering damages for worthy claims).
152. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of Devlin
court's position to Gideon court's position).
AIDS LIABILITY
who transmitted HIV to the carrier.53 A plaintiff who carries HIV will be
able to satisfy the physical injury and reasonable fear standards that courts
consistently have required a plaintiff to meet in order to recover damages
for fear of contracting a latent disease. 54 Infection with HIV is a physical
injury, even though HIV may not develop into AIDS for years. 55 In
addition, because an ordinary person who carries HIV reasonably will fear
contracting AIDS, an HIV carrier should be able to recover damages for
mental distress from fear that AIDS will develop. 15 6 Furthermore, if the
HIV carrier can prove that he is more likely than not to develop AIDS,
the HIV carrier should be able to recover damages for prospective AIDS.
157
If the HIV carrier cannot prove that he is more likely than not to develop
AIDS, the court should recognize HIV infection as a separate injury from




153. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (arguing that HIV infection is actionable
injury).
154. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (noting that HIV carrier should be
able to establish physical injury); supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (noting that HIV
carrier should be able to satisfy reasonable fear standard).
155. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (arguing that HIV infection is physical
injury that satisfies physical injury requirement).
156. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (arguing that HIV carrier should be
able to recover damages for fear of AIDS).
157. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (arguing that if HIV carrier can prove
he has greater than 50% chance of contracting AIDS, carrier should be able to recover damages
for prospective AIDS).
158. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (arguing that HIV carrier who cannot
recover damages for prospective AIDS should be able to recover for AIDS in separate cause
of action if AIDS later develops).
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